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Core labour standards defi ned by the ILO in 1998 are universal but applied 
very differently across countries. Compliance is much higher in high income 
countries. However, the causality between improved labour standards and 
economic growth remains a controversial issue. Export-led growth strate-
gies might encourage developing countries to curb the process of standards 
improvement. In this way, they can raise the volume of their unskilled labour 
endowments (child and/or forced labour) in order to strengthen their com-
parative advantage over compliant countries. We use a gravity model to as-
sess the trade impact of the level of compliance with core labour standards, 
distinguishing the effects on bilateral trade (geographical specialization) 
from the multilateral effects. We show that countries that meet the labour 
standards tend to trade more with each other, while non-compliant countries 
tend to trade more with compliant countries. These effects are identifi ed 
mainly with respect to child labour and freedom of association. Countries 
that meet labour standards tend to be less open, but differently depending on 
the standards, with a non-linear relationship for some of them. Less compli-
ant countries may simultaneously step up their trade and labour standards. 
For median countries, mainly the emerging countries, the level of compli-
ance with labour standards is “optimal”. 
Keywords: Exports, International Trade, Labour Standards, ILO, Gravity 
Models.
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Rൾඌඎආൾඇ
Los estándares laborales mínimos defi nidos por la OIT en 1998 son uni-
versales pero se aplican de manera muy diferente en los distintos países. 
El cumplimiento es mucho más alto en los países de altos ingresos. Sin 
embargo, la causalidad entre la mejora de las normas laborales y el creci-
miento económico sigue siendo un tema controvertido. Las estrategias de 
crecimiento dirigidas por las exportaciones pueden alentar a los países en 
desarrollo a frenar el proceso de mejora de las normas. De esta forma, pue-
den aumentar el volumen de sus dotaciones de mano de obra no califi cada 
(trabajo infantil y / o forzado) a fi n de fortalecer su ventaja comparativa 
sobre los países que cumplen con los requisitos. Utilizamos un modelo de 
gravedad para evaluar el impacto comercial del nivel de cumplimiento de 
las normas laborales fundamentales, distinguiendo los efectos sobre el co-
mercio bilateral (especialización geográfi ca) de los efectos multilaterales. 
Mostramos que los países que cumplen con las normas laborales tienden a 
comerciar más entre sí, mientras que los países que no cumplen tienden a 
comerciar más con los países que cumplen con los requisitos. Estos efectos 
se identifi can principalmente con respecto al trabajo infantil y la libertad 
de asociación. Los países que cumplen con los estándares laborales tienden 
a ser menos abiertos, pero de manera diferente dependiendo de los están-
dares, con una relación no lineal para algunos de ellos. Los países menos 
dóciles pueden al mismo tiempo intensifi car sus normas comerciales y labo-
rales. Para los países medianos, principalmente los países emergentes, el 
nivel de cumplimiento de las normas laborales es "óptimo".
Palabras clave: Exportaciones, comercio internacional, normas laborales, OIT, 
modelos de gravedad.
Códigos JEL: F13, F14, F16, F53, F6, J8.
I. Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ
The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights (1998) 
defi nes four core standards, embodied in eight conventions. These rights 
are universal and apply to all member countries, regardless of the level of 
economic development. This Declaration was inspired by the World Sum-
mit for Social Development in Copenhagen (1995), which included seven 
agreements. Since little protection against child labour was included in the 
Rൾඏංඌඍൺ ൽൾ Eർඈඇඈආටൺ ඒ Eඌඍൺൽටඌඍංർൺ | Vඈඅ. LIV| N° 1| 2016 | ඉඉ. 59-83 | ISSN 0034-8066 | e-ISSN 2451-7321
Cඈඋൾ අൺൻඈඎඋ ඌඍൺඇൽൺඋൽඌ, Bංඅൺඍൾඋൺඅ  ൺඇൽ Mඎඅඍංඅൺඍൾඋൺඅ Tඋൺൽൾ... 61
ILO conventions, a new convention was added to cover its worst forms 
(Convention 182). The four core labour standards, embodied in eight con-
ventions, are: 
• Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (Conven-
tions 87 and 98); 
• Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour (Conventions 
29 and 105); 
• Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupa-
tion (Conventions 100 and 111); 
• Recommended minimum age for child workers (Convention 138) and 
the elimination of the worst forms of child labour (Convention 182). 
There is a consensus about the positive correlation between the qual-
ity of labour standards and the level of development. Income per inhabitant 
is reportedly one of the drivers of compliance with core labour standards 
(Casella, 1996; Busse, 2004; Arestoff and Granger, 2003). Bazillier (2008) 
and Bonnal (2010a) confi rm the positive impact of core labour standards on 
long-run growth à la Solow (1956). However, the direction of causality and 
the transmission channels are still being discussed.
Following Solow (1956), endogenous growth models emphasize the 
positive role of accumulating production factors, especially human factors 
(Lucas 1988; Romer, 1989). Child labour and poor health and safety con-
ditions also combine to drive down the rate of human capital accumula-
tion and, consequently, future growth rates. Likewise, the different forms 
of labour standards violation aim to or effectively do cut wages to below 
their equilibrium rate (marginal labour productivity). However, this distor-
tion provides little incentive to the employer to invest in more capitalist 
processes of production, which burden productivity and keep growth rates 
down. Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) believe that upholding workers' rights 
facilitates coordination and raises productivity by reducing the effects of la-
bour/management confl ict on production and helping small open economies 
to adjust more rapidly to economic shocks, and this at the lowest possible 
cost. Martin and Maskus (2001) show that, in competitive markets, freedom 
of association should improve productivity. The freedom of association and 
collective bargaining are also often preferred to the introduction of a mini-
mum wage, which can crowd out low productivity adult workers from the 
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labour market and instead encourage the use of informal child labour (Basu, 
2000; Dinopoulos and Zhao, 2007).
Trade openness must be included in the chain of causality. Some 
authors locate trade openness at the beginning of the process (Griswold, 
2001): the best way to improve labour standards would be to encourage 
growth assumed as being stimulated by open trade. In this case, we speak 
of "endogenous" labour standards development: opening trade encourages 
growth and income, which in turn helps to reduce poverty, raise real wages 
and improve compliance with labour standards. Any measure that reduces 
international trade would therefore be counter-productive1.
Some studies explore the consequences of trade openness on labour 
standards. For example, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) show that the gradual 
relaxation of the rice export quota increased the relative price of this prod-
uct and therefore the income of the rural population, reducing child labour 
in rural areas. Adversely, the increase in the rice price for consumers led 
to a deterioration in the situation in urban areas. Busse (2004) posits that 
opening up trade signifi cantly reduces discrimination against women and 
child labour. Yet the impact of trade liberalization on forced labour and un-
ion rights is more ambiguous. However, Arestoff and Granger (2003) show 
that opening up trade has a negligible effect on the composite indicator for 
compliance with the ILO's four core labour standards. Edmonds and Pavc-
nik (2006) fi nd a negative relationship from trade to child labour, which 
becomes statistically insignifi cant when cross-country income differences 
are controlled (see also Neumayer and de Soya, 2005). 
One of the most discussed issues is the temptation, for some coun-
tries that have rallied to export-led growth strategies, to slow down this 
endogenous process, and even to regress in terms of labour standards com-
pliance, to reinforce their competitive advantage in an unfair “race to the 
bottom” process. The “lose-lose” game mainly concerns South-South trade 
in that countries in the South are rivals competing for similar sectors on 
the international markets (Elliott, 2003). The risk here is of deteriorated 
terms of trade if enough countries simultaneously raise their supply. This 
concern is shared by trade unions and anti-globalist movements, but also by 
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1.   See also the review of literature by Brown et al. (2011).
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international organizations such as the ILO and the OECD2, which keep a 
close eye on labour practices in export processing zones. Unfortunately, save 
some case studies, little comparative research has been conducted on this 
topic. The question is at the heart of the debate on the inclusion of a “social 
clause” in trade agreements. Under pressure mainly from developing coun-
tries, which denounced the protectionism of such a clause, the 1996 WTO 
Singapore Ministerial Conference denied any link between labour and trade3. 
This assertion must be checked. A non-signifi cant relation would confi rm 
it. A positive contribution of high labour standards to exports would open a 
window for rapid improvement in the less compliant countries. A positive re-
lationship between core labour standard non-compliance and exports would 
not be enough to prove the existence of unfair labour practices, but it would 
make plausible the capacity to contain labour standards to boost exports. 
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical elements in answer to 
the question: is the foreign trade of a country infl uenced by the level of its 
compliance with core labour standards?
In the fi rst section, we review the theory and past empirical evidence 
on this relation between labour rights and trade. Section 2 presents the 
econometric strategy based on gravity models. Section 3 explains how the 
data have been collected. Section 5 delivers some evidence and we conclude 
in section 6.
II. Tඁൾඈඋൾඍංർൺඅ ංඌඌඎൾඌ ൺඇൽ ඉඋൾඏංඈඎඌ ൾආඉංඋංർൺඅ ൾඏංൽൾඇർൾ
Many studies are based on the usual HOS theory, which presents 
the effects of labour standards on trade (Brown et al., 1996; Buss, 2004). If 
non-compliance with labour standards raises a country’s relative unskilled 
labour endowment, then that country’s comparative advantage in labour-in-
tensive goods will be strengthened and we can expect more trade with cap-
ital- (or skilled labour) abundant countries. However, an increase in exports 
of low-skilled labour-intensive goods might prompt a downturn in the terms 
of trade (see, for example, Brown et al., 1996).
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2. For example, EC-ILO (2011) and OECD (1996, 2000, 2007)
3. Simultaneously, an increasing number of free trade agreements include social clauses under di-
fferent forms but with a frequent reference to ILO's core labour standards. See Siroën (2013), 
International Labour Offi ce (2013), Kamata (2014), Agustí-Panareda et al. (2014).
We can reasonably consider that non-compliance with certain core 
labour standards, such as child labour and forced labour, increases a coun-
try’s relative low-skilled labour endowment. With the assumption of perfect 
substitutability, the effect of factor endowment should be known. However, 
we can also consider a substitution effect of one labour category for an-
other. If child labour and adult labour are totally interchangeable, the use 
of child labour may entail the exclusion of a proportion of the adult labour 
force from the market (Basu and Van, 1998; Hansson, 1981; Granger, 2003). 
Similarly, forced labour might be used alternatively to free labour. Lastly, if 
some categories of unskilled workers (adults, women) are replaced by other 
unskilled workers, such as children, the net effect on factor endowment is 
undetermined by the theory. 
Moreover, the positive, if not ambiguous, effect of child and forced 
labour on unskilled labour endowments might also be counterbalanced by 
the violation of other labour standards. Although discrimination prevents 
certain categories of the population from having access to the labour market 
(Becker 1971), it affects the quantity of labour used in production and the 
availability of unskilled workers. However, discrimination is also a facility 
for hiring segregated people in the informal economy with poorer labour 
conditions. Secondly, discrimination creates rigidity and affects productivi-
ty, thus preventing a more effi cient allocation of resources and trade perfor-
mances (Brownet al., 1996; Maskus, 1997; OECD, 1996). 
The role played by freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing rights is a highly challenged aspect, mainly because of “closed shop” 
unions, widely thought of as negative, in some Latin American countries 
(Elliott, 2003). Nonetheless, the unions' legitimacy usually lies in the chal-
lenge they present to the excessive and abusive powers of employers, which 
are often inadequately regulated by the public authorities and advantaged by 
other core standard violations, such as forced labour and child labour. The 
monopsonic behaviour of the employer leads to the labour being underpaid 
(Granger, 2003; Martin and Maskus, 2001; Morici and Shulz, 2001; Shel-
burne, 2004). The fi rms that have a monopsonic recruitment advantage can 
ration out their labour demand, and, therefore, production and exports, to 
put pressure on the price of labour. Consequently, not all available unskilled 
workers will be hired, reducing the country’s low-skilled labour endowment.
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The consequences of the level of compliance with core labour stand-
ards on factor endowment are ambiguous and, consequently, so are the ex-
pectations of their infl uence on trade. Because the theory is ambiguous, only 
empirical studies might settle the issue. Early studies show the absence of a 
correlation between labour standards and the volume of trade (OECD, 1996, 
2000; Mah, 1997; Raynauld and Vidal, 1998), but they do not use reliable 
indicators. The number of ILO conventions ratifi ed by a country is the most 
frequently used indicator in empirical studies (Rodrik, 1998; Busse, 2003; 
Cooke and Noble, 1998). Yet the deviation between convention content and 
actual application is such that this indicator should be considered with cau-
tion (Chau and Kanbur, 2001; Bonnal 2010, a, b). 
Van Beers (1998) fi nds that labour standards infl uence trade in 18 
OECD countries. Rodrik (1998) and Dehejia and Sammy (2004) show that 
timework and child labour contribute to a higher share of labour-intensive 
exports in total exports. In the same way, Kucera and Sarna (2006) fi nd 
that Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining have no 
signifi cant effects on total manufacturing exports, weaker rights in a country 
promote labour-intensive exports.
Granger (2005) builds her own indicators for the four core labour 
standards and concludes that violation by Southern countries tends to raise 
the volume of North-South trade. These studies confi rm the existence of a 
trade-labour linkage. 
Many empirical and econometric studies focus on the specifi c case 
of freedom of association and collective bargaining. They show that collec-
tive bargaining improves overall economic competitiveness (see, for exam-
ple, Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Martin and Maskus, 2001). Bonnal (2010b), 
using the rate of work injuries and the rate of strikes and lockouts, fi nd 
that better labour standards and institutions increase trade. Nonetheless, the 
estimates by Galli and Kucera (2004) fail to reveal any defi nite connection 
between upholding union rights and exports of labour-intensive goods. 
So far, the question has been tackled from a unilateral point of view: 
do countries respecting core labour standards trade more with the world? 
Trade relations concern instead country pairs and are infl uenced by bilateral 
trade costs such as tariffs, transport and insurance costs. Moreover, labour 
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standards might infl uence these bilateral trade costs for many reasons. For 
example, preferential agreements may include provisions on labour stand-
ards. Bagwell and Staiger (1998) posit that two countries respecting labour 
standards should conclude more reciprocal tariff reductions, which imply 
lower trade costs. Limão (2005) analyses the linkage trade policy - non-
trade social policy on international cooperation and demonstrates that the 
policy linkage might be sustainable when both policies issues are “strategic 
complement.” Our empirical study sets out to check whether labour stand-
ards affect bilateral trade relations as well as the total trade of countries.
III.Mൾඍඁඈൽඈඅඈ඀ඒ
The factor endowment theory hypothesis is that countries violating 
labour standards should increase their relative endowment in unskilled labour 
trade compared with compliant countries. Furthermore, these non-compliant 
countries should be more competitive and trade more under the “social dump-
ing” hypothesis than compliant countries (other things being equal), although 
a “lose-lose” game could cancel out the expected export value advantage. 
A good framework is Anderson and van Wincoop's specifi cation of 
the gravity model. Gravity models predict bilateral trade by the product of 
national incomes (GDP) and the distance between partners. Distance is a 
proxy for transport costs and the model may be "augmented" by other varia-
bles affecting bilateral trade costs. Model isolates "dyadic" (indexed ij) and 
idiosyncratic (indexed i or j) effects (Feenstra, 2004). The model proposed 
by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) introduces export and import country 
fi xed effects, which are usually used to quantify "multilateral resistance" by 
considering unobserved variables. In a cross-section model, fi xed effects 
also include usual and observable "idiosyncratic" variable (indexed i or j), 
including GDPs. The equation to estimate is then:
Log (Xij) = 1Log(Dij) +∑k Ψijk  + ∑ βk Zijl + ∑i DEi + ∑j DIj + εij   (1) 
Dij = distance between i and j; ijk = a matrix of k-vectors for mutual char-
acteristics (language, border, trade agreement, factor endowment, etc.).
Zijl = the l bilateral variables designed to measure the level of compliance 
with core labour standards; DEi (DIj) = exporter (importer) fi xed effects 
(dummy variable); εij  = error term. 
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However, the choice of variables of interest as regards to mutual 
compliance with labour standards by both partners raises a further issue for 
the cross-section estimates: unilateral variables such as income (GDP) and 
national labour standards level are perfectly collinear with country (exporter 
and importer) fi xed effects. In (1), since all unilateral characteristics are con-
trolled by fi xed effects, we can work solely with bilateral (dyadic) variables, 
including variables covering heterogeneous relative factor endowments and 
labour standards compliance between each country pair, which infl uence 
bilateral trade in an HOS framework. Given that developed countries are 
also skilled-labour abundant and usually compliant with labour standards, 
we must control for factor endowment heterogeneity to be sure of correctly 
isolating the effect of labour standards compliance differences. 
In a second step, the effect of labour standards on overall trade is 
estimated by estimating the fi xed effect variables on country-specifi c varia-
bles, including indicators of compliance with each type of labour standard.
Another econometric issue directly concerns the empirical methods 
used to estimate gravity equations. There is a long tradition of log-lineariz-
ing (1) and estimating the variables of interest by OLS. However, Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that heteroskedasticity is frequently under-
estimated by gravity models, even when a Huber-White estimator is used. 
Elasticities can then be highly misleading. To bypass these problems, Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) advocate testing trade variables in levels, i.e. 
testing Xij instead of Log (Xij), and using a robust Poisson Pseudo-Maxi-
mum Likelihood (PPML) estimator since it produces estimates robust to 
heteroskedasticity (Winkelmann, 2003). This equally superior method deals 
with zero trade fl ows that are lost in log transformation. Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2011) confi rm that the PPML estimator performs well even when 
the proportion of zeroes is very large. However, PPML cannot distinguish 
the countries whose characteristics give them zero trade probability from 
those with positive trade potential that are simply not trading. This gives 
rise to the over dispersion problem in the model. The zero-infl ated Poisson 
(ZIP) regression that we use specifi es fi rst a logistic equation in order to 
determine whether trade probability is zero or not. The common argument 
that ZIP models have the drawback of not being invariant to the scale of the 
dependent variable is not relevant if we use the same scale for PPML and 
ZIP. 
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IV. Dൺඍൺ
We use an “augmented” version of the basic gravity model, consid-
ering different trade cost components. The information on bilateral exports 
comes from the International Monetary Fund (Direction of Trade Statistics). 
GDP data are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Distance (distij) is the great arc circle kilometric distance between the two 
capitals of countries i and j (CEPII database). Contiguity (contigij) and 
colonial ties are also taken from CEPII’s Distance database. The common 
language data come from the CIA World Factbook. Dummies indicating 
common membership of a preferential trade agreement (agreementij) are 
from the WTO database. 
We have a problem with the usual variables of common language 
and common colonial link. First, defi ning the common language is some-
times hit or miss in multilingual countries. Second, there is an obvious link 
between language and colonizer. So we use a new variable called “cultural 
distance” (culdistij), which takes the value 1 when two countries share the 
same language (at least one language deemed offi cial by the CIA database) 
and/or had a colonizer-colonized link. 
Since we believe the contribution of labour standards to labour 
endowments to be a transmission channel, we need to control for relative 
factor endowment. Taking account the number of countries we consider, it 
is very challenging to get homogeneous data on relative factor endowments. 
We then use per capita GDP as a proxy for the unknown stock of capital or 
skilled labour, considering that this variable is positively correlated with 
the abundance of capital and skilled labour in the economy. In our HOS 
framework, we compare this proxy with the partner’s: the higher the value, 
the higher the bilateral trade. So factorendij compares MaxGDPpercapita, 
the GDP per capita of the "richest" country -i or j- to MinGDPpercapita, 
the GDP per capita of the other country (j if the country is "poorer" than i, 
i otherwise): 
factorendij = MaxGDPpercapita / MinGDP per capita.
Few databases include compliance with labour standards as defi ned 
by the ILO declaration. Some cover the legislation without factoring in en-
forcement. Others focus on different labour aspects (minimum wage, for 
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example)4 or merely certain standards as ratifi ed ILO conventions, child or 
female labour. Papers have previously used Granger’s database (Granger, 
2003, 2005; Granger and Siroën, 2010), which gives each separate core la-
bour standard (child labour, forced labour, discrimination and union rights) 
a score from 1 (total non-compliance) to 4 (total compliance). The coding 
method is based on the use of a large amount of qualitative and quantitative 
information from various sources, such as the ILO, the US Department of 
Labor, the US Department of State and NGO reports. 
However, Granger’s database ranks only 65 countries. This restric-
tion is due to the priority of keeping sources as diversifi ed as possible. Ba-
zillier (2008) prefers to expand the sample to 155 countries, even though 
this means reducing the number of sources used for scoring. He uses a simi-
lar method of scoring for the same period (end of the 1990s). From different 
sources of information, the index scores the four core labour standards + 
the number of ratifi ed ILO conventions from 1 (total compliance) to 5 (total 
non-compliance). He uses the MCA (Multiple Correspondence Analysis) 
method to build an aggregated index weighting the fi ve indexes. Bazillier 
fi nds a close correlation between his own indicator and Granger’s. We sys-
tematically apply the same methods to the same countries and verify that 
they give similar results in the following estimations even though the pa-
rameter values are quite different.  However, the introduction of a fi fth ILO 
convention ratifi cation indicator alongside the four core labour standards is 
highly debatable, not only due to the change of subject, but also because the 
number of ratifi cations is a misleading indicator of compliance with labour 
standards. For example, the USA has ratifi ed just 14 conventions (only two 
of the eight “core” ILO conventions) while Myanmar has ratifi ed 19. The 
Bazillier index has been rebuilt. We take the same weighting method (MCA) 
previously used by Bazillier. However, we exclude convention ratifi cations. 
Our index varies from 0 (worst compliance) to 1 (full compliance). 
We use this aggregated index (Agindex) to proxy the “social distance” 
(socdistij) between i and j in the equation:
socdistij= 1 + │Agindexi – Agindexj│(1 is added to avoid the null 
value for equally scored countries). So, this indicator can range from 1 (per-
fect similarity between both countries) to 2 (total dissimilarity).
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4.  See, OECD (1996), Rodrik (1998), Mah 1997, Van Beers (1998). 
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However, the social distance index only gauges social heterogeneity 
irrespective of labour practices. A pair of countries violating labour stand-
ards (0 in both countries) will have the same socdistij value as a couple of 
compliant countries (1 in both countries). Although this choice is in line with 
the tested hypothesis that heterogeneity in relative factor endowment creates 
trade, we must also consider the hypothesis that the impact on trade is af-
fected by compliance with labour rights. Two similarly compliant countries 
might trade differently than two non-compliant countries. Intra-industrial 
trade for differentiated goods, which is greater in compliant countries, is a 
consequence of factor endowment similarity, not of factor endowment het-
erogeneity. Unlike as previously, we then introduce two dummy variables: 
respectij taking the value 1 when both countries comply with labour stand-
ards (if Agindex>0.75 in i and j) and norespectij when they do not (Agindex 
≤ 0.75). The arbitrary threshold of 0.75 seems reasonable relatively to the 
distribution of the scores in the sample. Small variations of this threshold do 
not signifi cantly affect the results. The reference is then the case in which 
one country complies and not the other. The hypothesis regarding the trade 
impact of factor endowments suggests a negative sign for the two variables. 
However, in view of intra-industrial trade between similar countries, i.e. 
non-HOS trade, something different would be found for countries that com-
ply with the labour standards.
V. Eඏංൽൾඇർൾ
We fi rst consider the bilateral trade effect of compliance with labour 
standards, e.g. the factor endowment effect. From (1), we estimate bilateral 
exports with the usual variables of geographic distance (distij), common bor-
der (contigij), trade agreement (agreementij), cultural distance (culdistij), eco-
nomic distance (factorendij) and our variables of interest. We use two methods 
of estimation: PPML (including nil values) and ZIP (fi ltering nil values).
We fi rst (table 1, columns 1 and 2) test the social distance indicator 
(socdistij), which is never signifi cant. The factor endowment indicator (fac-
torendij) is signifi cantly positive in the other two estimations: countries with 
greater factor endowment differences trade more (signifi cantly at the 5% level). 
The absence of a social distance effect on trade might be due to the 
fact that the factor endowment hypothesis comes into play differently when 
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both countries comply with labour standards compared with when both vi-
olate them. We then introduce respectij and norespectij, which are defi ned 
above. The full satisfaction of the factor endowment hypothesis would im-
ply two negative signs because the reference is the heterogeneous case (one 
complies, the other not), which is assumed to increase differences in relative 
factor endowment as is a pro-trade effect. The two methods of estimation 
produce similar positive results. Columns 1 (PPML) and 2 (ZIP) show that 
the factor endowments hypothesis does not hold (respectij positive) for com-
pliant countries: a pair of countries both with high labour standards will trade 
more with each other than with countries with low labour standards. Con-
versely, violating countries export more to compliant countries (norespectij 
negative). Although these results considerably weaken the factor endowment 
hypothesis, they lend currency to the social dumping hypothesis.
In the theoretical part of the paper, we pointed up that although child 
labour and forced labour are expected to increase the endowment in unskilled 
labour, standards have ambiguous effects on trade for two main reasons: 
substitution effects (for example, child labour might reduce the demand for 
adults and tone down the expected increasing effect) and the nature of the 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PPML ZIP PPML ZIP
Variables xij xij xij xij
contigij 0.579*** 0.575*** 0.574*** 0.569***
distcultij 0.130* 0.128* 0.135* 0.132*
ln(distij) -0.630*** -0.632*** -0.629*** -0.631***
agreementij 0.535*** 0.528*** 0.542*** 0.536***
ln(factorendij) 0.050** 0.044** 0.043** 0.036*
socdistij 0.054 0.046
respectij 1.036* 1.010*
norespectij -1.144** -1.117**
Constant 4.881*** 4.960*** 6.069*** 6.115***
Wald Chi2 110798 109237
Observations 17465 17465 17465 17465
Country fi xed-effects yes yes yes yes
Table 1: Effects of labour standards compliance on bilateral exports
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***: 1%; **: 5%; ***: 10%
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violation (for example, restrictive monopsonistic demand for labour in the 
absence of trade unions affecting the low-skilled labour endowment).
Table 2 gives the coeffi cient of the previous variables of interest (the 
other coeffi cients are hardly affected), which are disaggregated at the level 
of each labour standard. We use the index for each labour standard (child 
labour, forced labour, discrimination, freedom of association), ranked from 
1 (the best) to 5 (the worst). Social distance is again the difference in partner 
countries' agindex levels, like the computation method for socdistij in table 
1. The social distance index for these new values ranges from 1 (full simi-
larity) to 5 (total dissimilarity). In columns 2 and 3, a country is considered 
compliant with a labour standard if the index is 1 or 2, and non-compliant 
for values of 3 to 5. Results are given for ZIP estimations only.
Social distance is only signifi cant for discrimination. The coeffi cient 
of the respect-no respect dummies is consistent with the results found at the 
aggregated level (table 1, column 4). Two labour standards, child labour 
and discrimination, are highly signifi cant, which is not the case for forced 
labour. Freedom of association is not very signifi cant at all, even with the 
same signs. If countries violating labour standards tend to export more than 
compliant countries, this is mainly due to child labour and discrimination at 
work and, less clearly, to freedom of association.
Social distance takes the value 1 (same index), 2, 3, 4 or 5. An al-
ternative to quantifying the infl uence of social distance is to introduce four 
dummy variables for each score, except 1, which is the reference (very close 
countries). Table 3 shows the results for the variable of interest only. It con-
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(1) (2) (3)
Social distance Both respect Both no respect
Child Labour (CLij) 0.035 2.323*** -2.216**
Forced Labour (FLij) 0.016 0.415 -0.551
Discrimination (Disij) 0.038** 1.789*** -1.985***
Freedom of Association (FAij) -0.033 1.070* -1.062*
Table 2: Effects of each labour standard on bilateral exports (ZIP)
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***: 1%; **: 5%; ***: 10%
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fi rms that social distance has little effect on trade but turns up an interesting 
result for child labour. Child labour differences act positively up to 3, but 
are increasingly negative for higher differences. We also note that discrimi-
nation is no longer signifi cant. 
We can conclude that the effect of social distance on trade depends 
on the level of compliance with core labour standards. Proximity fosters 
trade in the presence of “good” labour practices and deters it in the presence 
of poor practices. The countries that violate the core labour standards can 
expect to foster their trade only with compliant countries. This differen-
tiation explains why a measure of social distance that does not make this 
distinction, like our social distance indicator, fi nds opposite effects and is 
then not able to produce a signifi cant result.  
The estimations have hitherto concerned bilateral exports only. 
However, they give no clear information about each country’s overall vol-
ume of trade with the world. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) believe 
that exporter and importer fi xed effects are good proxies for “multilateral 
resistance”, under which bilateral trade is not only infl uenced by “dyadic” 
variables affecting the couple, but also by idiosyncratic variables specifi c to 
a country, but affecting all bilateral relations. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) 
consider that fi xed effects reduce the risk of endogeneity. They include all 
omitted variables with an idiosyncratic dimension.
In a second step, we regress exporter and importer fi xed effects de-
rived from the previous gravity model in models which introduce idiosyn-
cratic variables. We then use an OLS estimation.
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Social 
distance
Child Labour Forced Labour Discrimination Freedom of 
association
1 Ref. Ref Ref Ref
2 0.148** 0.030 -0.093 0.043
3 0.088 -0.183** 0.042 -0.102
4 -0.250** 0.110 0.079 0.019
5 -0.772*** 0.174 0.121 -0.240
Table 3: Effects of bilateral differences between labour 
standards on bilateral exports (ZIP)
  Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***: 1%; **: 5%; ***: 10%
Concerning the estimation of fi xed effects, the main issue is to choose 
the “preferred” gravity estimator used at the fi rst step. We opt for ZIP as 
the surest estimation method. Given that social distance (socdistij) is never 
signifi cant, we exclude it from the equation (table 1, column 2) and continue 
through to the equation estimated in table 1, column 4. Theoretically, fi xed 
effects are purged from the bilateral effects of labour standards. However, 
the index is built from the combination of unilateral variables, which might 
infl uence the fi xed effects, which would not then refl ect the entire infl uence of 
compliance with labour standards on trade with the world as a whole. We then 
extract fi xed effects from a new gravity ZIP equation that does not include 
bilateral indexes of labour standards (results are not introduced in the paper). 
We introduce some idiosyncratic variables: GDPi, population (popi) 
and remoteness (landlocked countries: landlocki). Usually, population is 
barely signifi cant, but we prefer to keep it in order to control also for eco-
nomic development, usually proxied by per capita GDPi. 
A variable contributing to higher fi xed effects (lower multilateral re-
sistance) is a pro-trade variable. If low labour standards help raise exports, 
then the hypothesis of “social dumping” as an instrument of a successful 
mercantilist “export-led growth” strategy may be deemed relevant. Import 
expectations are not so clear because social dumping might also be an in-
strument to protect the country from imports. However, mercantilism also 
implies facilitation for imported goods intended for processing, which is 
typically the case with export processing zones, frequently criticized for 
their labour behaviour.
The variable of interest is the aggregated index at country level (Ag-
indexi). The index ranges from 0 (no compliance) to 1 (full compliance). We 
also test a non-linear relation.
The regression using fi xed effects extracted from a gravity mod-
el without bilateral labour standards only gives signifi cant results in the 
non-linear relation with importer fi xed effects: more compliance with labour 
standards raises imports up to a threshold of 0.65 for the index.
When fi xed effects are purged from mutual compliance with labour 
standards, the results are more signifi cant for both linear and non-linear 
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specifi cations. Improvements in labour standards tend to reduce imports and 
exports. More specifi cally, in keeping with the non-linear relation, improve-
ments raise exports and imports only up to the low index of 0.36 and 0.45 
respectively. 
Once again, we must deepen the analysis taking into account the 
different infl uence of each standard. Then, we regress the fi xed effects on 
each labour standard from 1 (total compliance) to 5 (total non-compliance), 
fi rstly assuming a linear relation and secondly assuming a non-linear (para-
bolic) relation. A positive (negative) sign means that more non-compliance 
(compliance) fosters trade. Results are highly contrasted. 
In both the linear and non-linear model estimates, the more robust 
relation with trade is observed for the forced labour variable. The more 
forced labour a country uses, the more this country exports and imports. If 
we consider the non-linear relation, the effect is inversed (lower standards = 
lower trade) on the index (1 to 5), maximizing trade at the level of 3.38 for 
exports and 3.60 for imports. Among the countries with a score of 4, we fi nd 
Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco (and many Mediterranean countries), Malaysia, 
Russia, Singapore, etc., which have a very small margin to simultaneously 
improve both trade and labour standards.
With respect to freedom of association, the evidence is different 
for export and import fi xed effects. Concerning exports, the linear relation 
behaves well with a positive, signifi cant sign (lower standards-higher ex-
ports) while the non-linear relation does not work. The linear relation is 
also signifi cant for imports, but the non-linear regression greatly improves 
the quality of the test (F, R2) with once again a U-inversed relation at the 
threshold of 3.88. 
The relation between trade and child labour is clearly of a U-inversed 
type with a maximum threshold of 2.92 and 2.94 respectively; among coun-
tries at the “quasi-maximum” of 3 – Bolivia, China, India, Morocco, Brazil, 
Vietnam, i.e. the emerging countries – this means that a different level of 
standards, higher as well as lower, would contract trade.
Only the linear specifi cation gives signifi cant results for discrimina-
tion with a positive relation: more discrimination-more trade.
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The evidence shows that less compliant countries, frequently the 
poorest ones, may simultaneously raise trade and labour standards. For 
median countries, mainly the emerging countries, the level of compliance 
with labour standards is “optimal” from a mercantilist point of view and an 
improvement in labour standards might affect trade.  For the most compliant 
countries, the developed ones, their high respect of labour standards implies 
a trade shortfall.
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Export fi xed effect Import fi xed effect
Child Labour (CL) 0.031 0.922*** 0.040 0.953***
Child Labour (CL2) -0.158*** -0.162***
Forced Labour (FL) 0.177*** 0.994*** 0.144*** 0.626***
Forced Labour (FL2) -0.147*** -0.087**
Discrimination (Dis) 0.094* -0.152 0.120*** 0.249
Discrimination (Dis2) 0.040 -0.021
Freedom of Association (FA) 0.310*** 0.582** 0.144*** 0.675***
Freedom of Association (FA2) -0.045 -0.087***
Table 5: Impact on trade of compliance with each labour standard 
(fi xed effects)
  Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***: 1%; **: 5%; ***: 10%
VI. Cඈඇർඅඎඌංඈඇ
Labour standards and trade are not disconnected. 
There is signifi cant support for the factor endowment hypothesis 
when we consider non-compliant countries, which are more oriented to-
wards trade with compliant countries than with closer countries. However, 
we do not fi nd any evidence for the opposite case: compliant countries prefer 
trading with similar countries in terms of worker rights. 
We also fi nd some evidence in favour of the mercantilist hypothe-
sis, i.e. non-compliance with labour standards as a trade policy instrument 
used to stimulate exports and contain imports. However, for child and forced 
labour, the relation is non-linear. Increased compliance with labour stand-
ards raises international trade up to a threshold, around that where many 
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emerging countries are situated, and reduces it above. Clearly, developed 
countries that adopt high standards will trade relatively less, all things re-
maining constant in terms of size (GDP and population), development level 
and geographic characteristics.
This evidence cannot be interpreted as being conducive to a contain-
ment of national labour standards at a medium level or an argument for low-
ering them in developed countries. The sustainability of export-led growth 
without an improvement in labour standards is highly questionable. If trade 
can drive growth, non-compliance with core labour standards can also curb 
a development process led by the more sustainable improvement in human 
capital. The political and social sustainability of such a mercantilist policy is 
another issue, as shown by the recent strikes in the Chinese Free Trade Zone.
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